ARQ Protocols in Cognitive Decode-and-Forward Relay Networks: Opportunities Gain

In this paper, two novel automatic-repeat-request (ARQ) based protocols were proposed, which exploit coop- eration opportunity inherent in secondary retransmission to create access opportunities. If the signal was not decoded correctly in destination, another user can be acted as a relay to reduce retransmission rounds by relaying the signal. For comparison, we also propose a Direct ARQ Protocol. Specif- ically, we derive the exact closed-form outage probability of three protocols, which provides an effective means to evalu- ate the effects of several parameters. Moreover, we propose a new metric to evaluate the performance improvement for cognitive networks. Finally, Monte Carlo simulations were presented to validate the theory analysis, and a comparison is made among the three protocols

Byzantine Attack and Defense in Cognitive Radio Networks: A Survey

The Byzantine attack in cooperative spectrum sensing (CSS), also known as the spectrum sensing data falsification (SSDF) attack in the literature, is one of the key adversaries to the success of cognitive radio networks (CRNs). In the past couple of years, the research on the Byzantine attack and defense strategies has gained worldwide increasing attention. In this paper, we provide a comprehensive survey and tutorial on the recent advances in the Byzantine attack and defense for CSS in CRNs. Specifically, we first briefly present the preliminaries of CSS for general readers, including signal detection techniques, hypothesis testing, and data fusion. Second, we analyze the spear and shield relation between Byzantine attack and defense from three aspects: the vulnerability of CSS to attack, the obstacles in CSS to defense, and the games between attack and defense. Then, we propose a taxonomy of the existing Byzantine attack behaviors and elaborate on the corresponding attack parameters, which determine where, who, how, and when to launch attacks. Next, from the perspectives of homogeneous or heterogeneous scenarios, we classify the existing defense algorithms, and provide an in-depth tutorial on the state-of-the-art Byzantine defense schemes, commonly known as robust or secure CSS in the literature. Furthermore, we highlight the unsolved research challenges and depict the future research directions.Comment: Accepted by IEEE Communications Surveys and Tutoiral